The field of International Relations has long been concerned with how the unequal concentration of material power shapes the patterns and prospects of global governance (Foot et al. 2003; Ikenberry 2011; Ikenberry et al. 2011) .
1 Amongst this diverse literature, however, less attention has been given to the similarly important issue of how the international community should address resistance from the United States and other great powers 2 to new governance initiatives (Price 2004b ). Yet in the fields of security (bans on antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions), human rights (creation of a permanent International Criminal Court), and the environment (implementation mechanism for the Kyoto Protocol) coalitions of middle power states and their transnational civil society allies 3 have successfully negotiated binding multilateral rules that were more stringent than the United States and others like China, India, and Russia were willing to accept (Price 1998; Brem and Stiles 2009; Fehl 2012) . These instances of "non-great power" law making are interesting because they reflect a deliberate effort on the part of less materially powerful actors to use multilateral institutions to generate new standards of appropriate behaviour -in effect, to employ law to create social facts that could prospectively bear on all states regardless of their formal endorsement of the treaty. The decision to proceed without the great powers was thus the product of a calculation that global norms can be more effectively achieved via strong legal rules with incomplete membership that may be expanded over time, rather than by weaker agreements that from the outset include all of the allegedly most vital actors. Supporters of more rigorous treaties thus created ad-hoc diplomatic fora intended to blunt the traditional dominance of leading states and pushed ahead with negotiations even once it was clear that these actors would not support the resulting institutions.
This strategy poses an important puzzle for theories of IR, since it is widely held that successful global governance efforts must be directed by, or at least encompass, the most materially powerful states in the international system. A range of theories-especially realist and institutionalist variants-have assumed that predominant powers posses the military, economic, and diplomatic resources to manage and enforce international cooperation (Krasner 1976; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Thompson 2006; de Nevers 2007) . Critics therefore regarded efforts at law making without the great powers as politically naïve and likely to lead to weak institutions that would be unable to effectively address governance challenges; more seriously, by excluding key actors, these institutions could actually lead to worse outcomes than in the previous status quo (Morgan 2002; Goldsmith 2003) . This raises an important question concerning whether treaties can instantiate new international social standards-evidenced by changes in actor behaviour-when they fail to correspond to the wishes of the most powerful states. In other words, how (if at all) can non-great power law be said to matter, given its apparent limitations?
This article addresses the consequences of pursuing global institutions without the great powers in both theoretical and empirical terms. I first build on recent constructivist accounts of international law to explain how formal multilateral treaties may serve as effective instruments for the promotion of new norms in the absence of great power leadership (Reus-Smit 2003 , 2004a Brunnée and Toope 2010) . International law is an especially authoritative means for organizing international affairs and generating meaning because "law now provides in large part the vocabulary for contemporary politics." (Kratochwil 2014:1) Institutions are also embedded within a broader web of principles, norms, and rules that structure the international system and inform the development of more particular practices. International law is thus both situated within and contributes to processes of social construction in the international system by constituting actors and defining the boundaries of (un)acceptable action. This "nested" quality of law further explains how particular treaties may succeed without recourse to forms of enforcement emphasized in the extant literature.
My particular interest is not with the initial negotiation of multilateral institutions-a subject that has been well addressed already-but rather with their subsequent impact in shifting international expectations and resulting policies. I show that treaty proponents can build efficacious international legal institutions by harnessing the social power of law with respect to two distinct constituencies of state actors. First, because international legal obligation derives from the internal practices of law rather than external forms of coercion or instrumental advantages, treaties may generate communities of legal commitment among their members in the absence of agency from predominant actors. Second, treaties are tied to the wider universe of international legal and social practice, and for this reason may generate informal compliance and adaptation among non-party states even as these actors remain outside the formal legal agreement. In both respects, my account challenges sceptical assumptions regarding the prospective influence of institutions by refocusing attention away from law as constraint in favour of an emphasis on how treaties may generate changes in conceptions of appropriate action. The creation of institutions to counter the policy goals of dominant actors and promote alternative standards of behaviour is thus a key way that less materially powerful states can influence global politics.
To unpack these effects, I examine an archetypal non-great power institution, the 1997
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Important scholarly accounts have documented how the ban on antipersonnel (AP) mines emerged and was codified Price 1998 ), yet there has been less sustained consideration of whether and how the treaty has generated observable policy change as evidence of a strengthening global norm (Price 2004a; Herby and Lawand 2008; Bower and Price 2013) . The mine ban also constitutes a hard case for international norm change since it aims to eliminate a weapon that was in widespread contemporary use-thus intervening in the security affairs of the state where rigorous obligations are thought to be least efficacious-without the enforcement capacity provided by the most powerful states. This is ultimately a structural account of legal impact that aims to provide an overview of global incorporation of mine ban norm. As a consequence, the present study does not delve deeply into mechanisms of socialization at the level of individual states, bureaucracies, or human beings, preferring instead to highlight patterns of adaptation and change across the international system. I do, however, briefly identify some key domestic processes, and reflect further on these in final section of the article. The focus on a single treaty case also naturally limits the explanatory breadth, though the trade-off in terms of empirical detail is warranted in my view. Indeed, evaluating state change under these challenging conditions offers the chance to develop rich data as a first step in addressing the conditions under which non-great power law making may be appropriate. In the conclusion, I outline a research agenda that builds on insights from the present study to better understand both the promise and perils of pursuing international legal rules and norms without the great powers.
THE ASSUMPTION OF GREAT POWER LEADERSHIP
The notion that the international system requires concerted management from a power or powers has a long pedigree in the academic study of international relations and resonates with a popular view of international politics. Prominent theories of IR thus expect that dominant states will leverage their material and diplomatic advantages to exert disproportionate influence over governance by deploying coercive threats and sanctions (Thompson 2006; de Nevers 2007) , providing collective goods (Krasner 1976; Norrlof 2010) , and promoting particular conceptions of appropriate behaviour (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Fordham and Asal 2007) . Scholars have therefore emphasized US agency in underwriting the post-World War II liberal international order and its continuing leadership in areas as diverse as arms control, environmental protection, and global finance and trade (Foot et al. 2003; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry 2011 ).
More recently, the rise of the so-called "BRICS" countries has generated extensive debate concerning the existence, nature and extent of a shift in the global balance of power to encompass new great powers, and what this may mean for the future of global governance (Hurrell 2006; Destradi 2010 ). The coincidence of political power and governance comes at a price, however, as great powers frequently use their predominant status to entrench unequal rights and responsibilities in international law (Krisch 2005) . As a consequence, the international community often incorporates a variety of concessions to great power demands, limiting the scope of legally binding rules to facilitate their participation in institutions. Yet in other instances the great powers-most especially the United States-have publicly rejected new international governance initiatives, presenting scholars and policymakers with a challenge concerning how to respond to intransigence in negotiations (Price 2004b ).
On its face, the decision to proceed without the support of the great powers would seem unlikely to lead to broadly effective international institutions because it runs counter to the most common view of the sources of legal obligation and institutional efficacy. Rationalist IR theories-broadly encompassing realist and institutionalist approaches-presume states are selfinterested, utility-maximizing actors that resort to cooperation only when it is valuable either in providing an additional means of exerting control in the international system (Mearsheimer 1994; Glennon 2001) , or in facilitating mutual gain through collective action (Koremenos 2013 ).
These theories also adopt a positivist view of legal obligation in which commitments may only accrue via voluntary consent. International law is thus regarded as a set of agreed constraints designed to address previously established cooperation challenges; processes of legal creation are a response to and reflection of existing goals and interests, rather than a source of new conceptions concerning appropriate actors or action in their own right (Abbott et al. 2000; Koremenos et al. 2001; Guzman 2008) . While institutionalist scholars do acknowledge that engagement within institutional structures will change preferences over time-especially by altering calculations of self-interest with respect to material pay-offs, reputation and the likethese interactions leave underlying identities unaltered.
An assessment of the prospects for non-great power law must therefore confront two more particular theoretical challenges. First, the autonomous power of such treaties is assumed to be proscribed by the voluntary nature of law. Von Stein (2005) has argued that since states selfselect into joining treaties, this screening effect dramatically reduces the independent impact on subsequent behaviour that can be attributed to institutions. Treaties are thus expected to offer only a weak constraint on the practice of those states that do accept their dictates, since "most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement," (Downs et al. 1996:380) . Moreover, treaties cannot formally bind non-parties and should consequently have little if any influence over the behaviour of third states. This is especially true for powerful states that possess the material and diplomatic resources to resist outside pressures (Glennon 2001; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008) .
Second, such institutions fail to encompass dominant political actors with the greatest resources to facilitate cooperation. This is a problem because rationalist theories regard compliance as emanating from the ability of an institution to ensure a more or less consistent stream of goods-order or more diffuse gains from collective action-rather than an "internal" sense of obligation owing to the social legitimacy of the law (Reus-Smit 2003) . Both realist and institutionalist accounts thus assume that agreements require some form of (often decentralized) monitoring and enforcement to deter cheating and maintain the smooth operation of transactions (Abbott et al. 2000:402-403, 418; Guzman 2008; Thompson 2009 ). The absence of key powers that might otherwise provide these functions is compounded by the fact that many regimes lack formal institutional enforcement provisions. Treaties concluded without great power support should therefore be particularly ineffectual since they will only ratify the existing goals of less important actors and thereby leave out the vital constituency of states that is allegedly most consequential to a treaty's subsequent implementation.
LAW AND NORMS WITHOUT THE GREAT POWERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS Nested Social Structures and the Power of Law
Adopting insights from recent constructivist accounts can help to address the challenges noted above (Finnemore and Toope 2001; Reus-Smit 2003 , 2004a Brunnée and Toope 2010) . For constructivists, international law is not defined by a set of formally promulgated binding rules backed by some means of enforcement-as per rationalist approaches-but rather by a particular mode of reasoned interaction based in precedent that generates categories of meaning and more specific permissive and prohibitionary standards. International law's essence is rooted in a principled justificatory discourse in which actors debate the content, scope, and application of rules, in reference to previously articulated norms and procedures. These repertoires of ideas, behaviours, and language aggregate over time as precedents that structure international legal practice. In this sense, international law can be conceived as both a vocabulary and grammar for articulating forms of acceptable and unacceptable action in the international system: it provides a language for describing certain types of activities in relation to existing law-as "legal" or "illegal"-and defining criteria by which ideas and actions may be presented -in effect, "tell[ing] us which constructions are permissible." (Borgen 2009:2) Law is not only a collection of procedures and rules that serve to regulate and constrain, therefore, but is itself a fundamental means by which social life is created and re-created freely in the international system, but are necessarily connected to pre-existing and more foundational principles, norms, rules, and organizational forms, and gain impetus from these associations. The basic building blocks of this legal architecture are found in a set of historically specific fundamental institutions-in the contemporary era, territorially based sovereign statehood, contractual international law, the sanctity of commitments, and multilateral diplomacy-that act as ordering principles to define the proper form and purpose of political communities (Reus-Smit 1997) . These are mirrored in the development of customary legal norms relating to (for example) the legal personality and consequent responsibilities of states and other actors, the notional inviolability of borders, human rights, and the use of force (Byers 1999 ). These constitutional features provide a basis for mutual recognition in identifying legitimate social actors and developing more detailed criteria of acceptable behaviour manifested as legal rules. Hence, evolving norms concerning the scope of sovereignty and nature of fundamental human dignity have provided the fodder for international social change in areas as diverse as abolishing slavery, piracy, and territorial conquest, the decolonization and antiapartheid movements, and the global promotion of democracy (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008) .
This social density is key to the influence that international law can command.
Constructivist scholars contend that states and other actors observe legal rules and norms because they regard the legal system as a whole as legitimately emerging from their own intersubjective practices. Rules are thus to be obeyed not simply because they are deemed valid or useful in isolation, but because legal structures are linked to the constitutive features of the international system and thereby precede and inform the rational pursuit of self-interest via law (Reus-Smit 2003:613) . While compliance is driven in part by the desire of state actors to advance individualistic goals like improving organizational efficiency, bolstering their reputation or avoiding sanctions, these considerations are given meaning by a pre-existing belief that law is an especially legitimate means of social order, and consequently worthy of adherence. While politics and law are inextricably linked and necessarily interactive, actors regard the international legal realm (ideally) as a distinctive field in which outcomes are determined by the application of accepted principles, discourses, and practices of law rather than a purely political calculus driven by particularistic self-interest and the distribution of material power (Reus-Smit 2004b:36-37; Abbott and Snidal 2013:35) . The transition to a legal form thus invests a norm with a particular rational-legal authority that is regarded as more legitimate and binding than non-legal standards.
In this way, the resort to law is not just "cheap talk," but profoundly influences the construction and conduct of international politics. (Percy 2007:387; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008:1) . Put differently, a treaty serves as a public declaration that further clarifies the content of a norm and specifies its application to a particular context (providing greater certainty in terms of the scope and limits of obligation), and provides an institutional context for subsequent discursive efforts aimed at implementing, contesting, or further refining the law (Abbott et al. 2000:412-413; Brunnée and Toope 2010:48) . 4 In this way, the legalization 5 of norms matters to subsequent institutional efficacy by generating more authoritative-and hence socially powerful-cognitive and discursive resources for articulating and adjudicating debates over appropriate action.
Key to this account is the social power generated by iterative, intersubjective dialogue structured by legal criteria, and the dense connections that are built between new institutions and more established international structures. First, since international legal obligation is fundamentally predicated upon, and sustained by, conceptions of appropriateness rather than enforcement, a treaty may bind its members without resort to the agency typically associated with leading states. Parties to a treaty have agreed to a set of obligations underpinned by broader social expectations concerning the legitimacy of law and the observation of commitments.
Exposure to diplomatic processes can thus exert social pressures on state actors to endorse new ways of thinking with respect to matters of cause-and-effect and acceptable behaviour in the international system so as to conform to a newly articulated component of "responsible"
statehood. These distinctly social qualities hold the potential to raise the costs of violations and the benefits of adherence beyond what can be provided by material inducements or coercive sanctions alone.
This does not imply that treaty members must deeply identify with constituent obligations from the outset. States may initially join a treaty for self-interested reasons such as an attempt to diffuse criticism or gain material benefits. Yet in an environment governed by expectations of adherence and pro-social behaviour, continued participation in a treaty regime can generate pressures towards greater conformance and, gradually, the internalization of norms. The social processes that initially typified the negotiations carry over to the implementation phase and in this way, institutions help coordinate successive efforts to generate compliance with and internalization of these new behavioural standards through the deployment of discursive claims concerning the status of the law, social rewards and punishments, and material resources Sikkink 1999, 2013; Dai 2007; Smith-Cannoy 2012) . Over time, these structured engagements can themselves generate greater affinity with legal norms and the re-construction of actor identities. I do not trace these processes in detail at the domestic level, but rather look for broad patterns and surprising results that suggest norm adoption across the system of states.
Second, the nested structure of international law means that treaties may generate social pressures towards compliance even among those states that reject their binding legal obligations. Hence formal membership does not exhaust the ways in which treaties and associated norms may bear on the formation and execution of state policy. Resistant states may partially comply with a treaty, even as they continue to resist its legal force. This can take the form of ending some prohibited behaviours; in such cases, legal norms have the effect of foreclosing previously unexceptional acts while simultaneously increasing their perceived importance, rendering any policy reversal a more substantial political issue that it would have been otherwise.
These behavioural adaptations may be mirrored in changes in state discourse that reflect an abandonment of certain rhetorical strategies due to a sensitivity to the social expectations fostered by a treaty. Under these conditions contestation is important precisely because it frequently reflects legal and normative reasoning and thus bolsters the legitimacy of the legal norm, in contrast to instances where a non-party succeeds in ignoring or rejecting a new institutional entirely. These processes may lead, over time, to further engagement by non-parties with the treaty and an incremental adoption of its standards; this can occur informally, initially by changing cost-benefit calculations with respect to informal compliance, and ultimately, perhaps, by altering underlying interests to correspond with treaty obligations.
These theorized dynamics point to a further concern with how institutional efficacy can be assessed. How, in other words, do we know when a treaty has successfully instantiated a widely respected international social standard influencing the conduct of world politics? Richard
Price has previously suggested that the impact of a legal initiative is most clearly apparent when "an emergent international rule induces states to engage in practices they would not otherwise perform." (Price 2004a:114) Hence any assessment must be set against an implicit counterfactual in which observed behaviours (both adherence and contestation) differ from those which would have occurred absent the given norm or rule, and where the most persuasive evidence is drawn from instances where actor change is most unlikely and surprising. This is particularly important since, as already noted, many IR theories assume that non-great power treaties will at most reflect a set of relatively unchallenging commitments among a sub-set of (typically less powerful) states for which the legal restraints do not impose substantial burdens. Effectively countering this view therefore requires not only evidence of substantial policy shifts, but equally an account of why-whether for formal parties or non-parties-the observed adherence was due to the impact of legal rules or norms rather than an unproblematic convergence of pre-existing
interests.
Yet this must be conditioned by a recognition that, as social phenomena, the impact of norms is bound to vary with respect to the rate, breadth, and depth of internalization and policy change (Kirgis 1987; Price 2006) . Most treaties do not enjoy perfect compliance, and the Mine Ban Treaty is no exception. Yet legal rules and norms can be "counterfactually valid," in that they may continue to exert authority in the face of some contrary behaviours. Since norms are intersubjective social constructions, their power to shape outcomes can be partially assessed by the way that alleged or proven transgressors explain their actions in order to maintain their status as legitimate members of the international community, and the response such claims receive from other relevant actors (Price 2006:261-263 2007:40-42) . But since international law is created, reproduced, and modified through publicly expressed views, official discourse constitutes highly relevant evidence concerning the effect of legal institutions irrespective of any judgement concerning the underlying sincerity of a claim.
A CASE STUDY IN NON-GREAT POWER LAW: THE BAN ON ANTIPERSONNEL MINES Overview
As the multilateral legal expression of the norm, the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty seeks to eliminate an entire category of weapons by prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel (AP) mines, along with a entrenching a series of positive obligations concerning the clearance of existing minefields and the provision of care for mine survivors. 6 The treaty draws inspiration from established international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly in reference to the notion that the right to choose the methods of warfare is not unlimited, prohibitions on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, and an articulation of the twin principles of distinction and discrimination (Maslen 2005:66-71) . The rationale for a ban rests on a judgement that the inherent characteristics of AP mines-most especially concerning their persistence once deployed and inability to distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians-mean that they cannot be employed in a way that would sufficiently respect existing legal principles (International Committee of the Red Cross 1997; Price 1998:627-631).
At its heart, therefore, the MBT seeks to overturn a well-established international social standard that has traditionally regarded AP mines as largely unproblematic tools of war, subject to the same forms of regulation as other conventional military technologies like artillery shells, rockets, and personal infantry weapons. This entailed a fundamental re-conception of the meaning and limits of military utility, especially as AP mines were in widespread use at the time of the proposed ban. 7 Hence, contrary to the claim that treaties only reflect existing interests (Downs et al. 1996; von Stein 2005) , I contend that the mine ban constitutes a dramatic change in the international status quo regarding the legitimate conduct of warfare.
Moreover, the treaty seeks to implement this new social expectation in the face of concerted resistance from major military powers. The United States, China, India, and Russia (among others) have long maintained that the deleterious humanitarian effects of AP mines stemmed from their irresponsible use by poorly trained armed forces and rebel groups and not from the legitimate operations of modern militaries (Morgan 2002) . These states consequently supported an alternative legal framework that further regulated, but did not eliminate, the use AP mines, codified in Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons. 8 It is particularly significant, then, that the process leading to the Mine Ban Treaty was precipitated by widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of negotiations on APII, which was regarded by many states and civil society groups as "overly complex and insufficiently stringent to deal with the extent of the humanitarian crisis." (Maslen 2005:22) In contrast to earlier diplomatic experiences, the negotiation of the MBT was animated by a calculation that a global stigmatization of AP mines would be most effectively achieved via an uncompromising prohibition that permitted no exceptions, rather than through a more modest agreement that included concessions to military powers (Cameron 1998 These measures of state change are evidence of a dramatic shift in the way in which the weapons are conceived in international society. The removal of AP mines as a tool of war is notable because it is not matched by a similarly substantial decline in the frequency of violent conflict in the international system: while the total number of armed conflicts has ebbed globally since the early 1990s, organized violence remains common. Moreover, intra-state conflictsprecisely those in which inexpensive weapons predominate-continue in significant numbers.
13
Yet the use of AP mines has now become an aberration in international practice. Were it not for the effective stigmatization of the weapon initiated by the mine ban movement and treaty, we would expect AP mines to feature in a greater number of these conflicts, many of which had seen past use of the weapons. This suggests that something more than altered material conditions is responsible for this dramatic change in observed behaviour. 15 These developments challenge the expectation that states would avoid costly obligations that require they abandon a potentially useful weapon, or in instances where they lack the capacity to make the necessary political, legal, and military adaptations. It has been more than four months since the declaration of our independence on 9 July 2011, in which my country has promised the world it would honor all the principles of international law by playing an active role in peace and world security…. Having seen the devastation including severe injury and environmental damage caused by landmines during the twentyone years of fighting for freedom, the movement / army of liberation of the people of Sudan banned the use of landmines in all combat operations. We have defended the cause of the treaty before becoming a state. (Republic of South Sudan 2011) In such cases, endorsement of the mine ban has been explicitly understood to signal a break with the previous political order and a consequent (re-)induction into the international community, as also happened with states like Serbia and Montenegro and South Africa.
This transformation in a core feature of state policy also occurred in states that came to be regarded as key supporters of the movement to ban AP mines -and hence allegedly easy cases for norm adoption. In his seminal article, Price (1998) The desire to adhere to the mine ban as a marker of status then stimulated a search for alternative technologies to replace AP mines in military doctrine, efforts that interacted with a perceived improvement in the security challenges facing the two states. 16 Yet such assessments were not driven by dispassionate judgements that changes in material conditions had rendered mines irrelevant, as a realist account would suggest, but rather relied to a substantial degree on shifting conceptions of the nature of military utility itself. The key here was the reciprocal dialogue between an external social stigma and domestically derived perception of interests, in which relevant policy actors came to accept that national security goals could be achieved without antipersonnel mines, in light of a powerful new standard of appropriate behaviour. This further demonstrates the constructivist contention that material conditions are not stable
properties, but are themselves fundamentally assessed through social processes of identity formation and change (Wendt 1992) . Finland therefore ratified the MBT in January 2012 while
Poland followed suit in December of the same year.
[
C Head] Exceptional Politics: Denials, Justifications, and the Status of the Mine Ban Norm
The social power of the mine ban has been further reinforced in moments where the legal prohibition has come under threat from real or apparent violations. Allegations of noncompliance have, in the first instance, frequently been met with vigorous denials by the subject states, as was the case when Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were accused of deploying AP mines (Bower 2012:134-137) . In Second, these discursive processes have taken place within a diplomatic environment in which State Parties and civil society actors frequently engage in public and private diplomacy with the aim of reinforcing the legal authority of the treaty. These iterative engagements are crucial to building a collective sense of community and with it a commitment to the treaty as legitimate and obligating. Price (1998:617) has previously noted that "violations provide the most opportune moments to define and discipline a particular practice as an aberration." It is therefore significant that other MBT members have issued repeated, if often cautious, statements condemning violations and reiterating the absolute prohibition against mine use (e.g., States
Parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, 2014: 72). Just as importantly, interventions have employed both the specific legal criteria of the treaty and broader associated principles of international law-such as rules of IHL and expectations concerning the observation of legally binding commitments-as focal point for discussions over deviance and good practice. is that embeddedness within the wider international legal and social system generates pressures to conform to more specific rules and norms despite official ambivalence. It is therefore significant that non-parties are deeply integrated in the operations of the mine ban regime, participating in meetings as official observer delegations.
[C Head] Rhetorical Adaptation and Its Consequences
Exposure to the mine ban norm has manifested itself first in the widespread adoption of general treaty claims in non-party discourse. Virtually every non-member state has expressed support for the humanitarian aims of the ban, and has identified AP mines as a significant and enduring threat to civilian populations (Bower 2012:128-132) . In doing so, moreover, they have suggests that engagement in the mine ban regime and wider international system is crucial to prospects for norm adoption. Exposure to diplomatic processes has frequently generated change in state policies, while the discursive adoption of core institutional claims provides the rhetorical opening by which outside actors may draw states into dialogue and push for greater behavioural adaptation. However, the findings could be bolstered with detailed tracing in discrete state cases with the aim of understanding the mechanisms-including coercion, reputation, side payments, persuasion, and social pressure-through which legal rules and norms are internalized or challenged, and the relevant sub-state actors-such as bureaucrats, military officers, and political elites-involved in these processes, as numerous studies have done in other issue areas.
A wider scholarly agenda would also attend to the agency of non-state actors in two case; yet this organization is itself composed of myriad sub-organizations and individuals spanning peace activists, religious and community groups, academics, former government officials, lawyers, and so on. In the future, particular attention should paid to identifying these domestic and transnational actors, specifying the various roles and degrees of access they enjoy, and the potential impact this has on the rates and extent of state change.
On the other hand, a richer account of normative change must seek to account for the response to new international standards among entities like multinational corporations and armed non-state actors. There are particular methodological challenges in studying internalization and implementation in such entities, since the former are typically not directly involved in relevant diplomatic settings and the latter often exist on the periphery of international recognition and may lack a stable composition and leadership structure. Yet such actors play an important role in the reception of global norms, nor least because they are frequently implicated in violations concerning armed violence, human rights, and environmental protection (among many issue areas). Examining these processes systematically also offers an opportunity to compare how mechanisms for generating compliance operate in state and non-state contexts (Jo and Thomson 2014) .
Finally, linking concerns for mechanisms and actors, future research on non-great power law must seek to situate the MBT within the wider universe of actual or potential cases (Brem and Stiles 2009; Fehl 2012 Incorporating instances where the United States and others powers did successfully shape new institutions will provide greater analytic leverage in evaluating both the prospects and perils of the particular type of governance highlighted here.
Thinking of particular institutions as part of a nested international legal and social system offers important leverage in explaining these divergent outcomes. Actors promoting new legal institutions are not creating the world anew, but are rather tapping into a highly resonant shared legal heritage within the context of an international social system that already privileges law as a particularly legitimate mode of claim making. Yet these linkages are not automatic, but must be cultivated: emergent subjects that can be persuasively connected to existing norms are much more likely to become widely respected international standards (Price 1998 (Price :627-631, 2003 Finnemore and Toope 2001:749) . Inversely, institutions that sharply diverge from past experience should be expected to face the greatest challenge at both the negotiation and implementation phases. But what types of norms are most amenable to codification in binding multilateral rules and subsequent widespread adoption? Previous research has suggested that issue characteristics matter, implying that certain subjects may be more or less suitable for effective governance. The content of a proposed norm may for instance bear on its prospective appeal, as "issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, and legal equality of opportunity" are most likely to lead to successful development of new norms and (potentially) legal rules (Keck and Sikkink 1998:204) . This was clearly the case in the most prominent examples of institutional development without the great powers: discourses of humanitarianism were central to the emergence and consolidation of the mine ban, as noted at length above. Yet similar logics propelled the development of the ICC and more recent Convention on Cluster
Munitions and, in a broader sense of harm to human populations and the natural environment, the Kyoto Protocol.
While such discourses appear critical, they are not sufficient in isolation, since do not fully explain negative cases -the non-adoption of a comprehensive treaty banning child soldiers, for example, would also seem to fit the criteria of humanitarian impact that has pervaded successful cases. A variety of other potential factors may influence the prospects for legal and normative development, including the purported immediacy of the issue (itself partly a function of agenda-setting), the technical difficulty of proposed solutions, and the potential for selfenforcement via reciprocity (Price 2003:598-600; Hafner-Burton et al. 2012:60-69) . Similarly, successful instances of non-great power diplomacy all share a fundamental coalitional structure combining geographically diverse middle power states and transnational civil society as leaders in norm development. Recent work applying social network analysis to TCS advocacy has further demonstrated that linkages between individuals and groups within a campaign profoundly shape what issues are adopted and the success with which they proliferate in the international system (Carpenter 2011) . Systematic, comparative research can suggest whether certain issue areas-trade, disarmament, human rights, and environmental protection, among others-are more or less susceptible to the type of multilateralism discussed here, and whether alternative legal and non-legal approaches may be more appropriate. This would help scholars and policymakers alike better understand the conditions under which non-great power diplomacy may prove successful, and when such a strategy is to be avoided.
